We show how to achieve differential privacy with no or reduced added noise, based on the empirical noise in the data itself. Unlike previous works on noiseless privacy, the empirical viewpoint avoids making any explicit assumptions about the random process generating the data.
Introduction
Differential privacy [6] is a general method for statistically querying a database while guaranteeing that information about individual rows is not exposed. This is useful to preserve the privacy of individuals, if the rows represent individuals. In the classical setting, the database is deterministic, and the basic idea is to add controlled noise (typically Laplacian or Gaussian noise) to the answer before reporting the results of the statistical query. The size of the noise can be taken to be the maximum difference between the queries for any pair of databases that differ by one row, divided by a privacy budget. For multiple private queries on the same database, privacy budgets are additive. What this guarantees is that the probability of any set of query results does not change multiplicatively by more than the privacy budget when individual rows are added or removed.
Unfortunately, the amount of noise that must be added is often very large, obscuring the desired statistical information. The work of Yitao Duan [4, 5] and others [2, 7] shows a different way. Instead of posing multiple randomized queries against a single deterministic database, we can pose a single deterministic query against a random database. If the rows are labeled by individual, this still gives us a probability distribution of answers with and without the individual, and we can demand differential privacy by asking that the probability of any particular query result does not change multiplicatively by more than the privacy budget when any individual's data is added or removed. Yitao Duan showed that privacy of sum queries could be ensured under certain specific statistical assumptions on how the random database was generated (with independent, identically distributed rows).
Empirical Approach
In the present work, we instead take an empirical approach. We assume that there is a whole sequence of databases (for example, a time series of databases), against each of which we will make a (for now) single deterministic statistical query. The sequence of databases represents an empirical sample from a hypothesized probability distribution of databases. From this sequence of databases, we can thereby produce an empirical sample of values of the statistical query, both with and without any particular individual's data. This allows us to test the empirical differential privacy of the query by seeing how the empirical probability distribution of the answers differs with and without any individual's data. Definition 1 Given a set of databases X t indexed by t, with each row labeled with an individual i, and a deterministic or randomized query f (X), let P denote the empirical probability distribution determined by the sample f (X t ) over all t. Furthermore, if X t i is the same set of databases with the data from individual i removed, let P i denote the empirical probability distribution determined by the sample f (X t i ) over all t. Then we say that f is empirically (ε, δ)-differentially private based on the given sample iff, for all individuals i, and all sets of potential query results E,
To practically implement this definition, rather than having to test the privacy condition against all possible events E, we can instead reformulate the condition in terms of the empirical probability density function:
Theorem 1 Let p and p i be the empirical probability densities with and without individual i, derived from the samples f (X t ) and f (X t i ) (respectively). Then the statistical query f is empirically (ε, δ)-private if, for all i, the densities p and p i differ by a factor of at most exp(ε), with the exception of a set on which the densities exceed that bound by a total of no more than δ.
To prove this claim, let A be the set where the densities differ by less than the required factor (i.e., p ≤ exp(ε)p i and p i ≤ exp(ε)p), and B be the complement of A. Then for any set of potential query results E,
The same works with the roles of P and P i reversed, proving that the empirical probability distributions obey (ε, δ)-privacy.
Because the above privacy property holds for all events E, empirical differential privacy is immune to post-processing, just like classical differential privacy:
Theorem 2 Let f be an empirically (ε, δ)-differentially private query. If g is a deterministic function on the range of f , then g • f is empirically (ε, δ)differentially private. If g is a randomized function on the range of f , then g • f is empirically (ε , δ )-differentially private, where (ε , δ ) exceeds (ε, δ) by any fixed margin with probability approaching zero as the number of samples g(f (X t )) grows.
The proof is the same as in the classical theory [6] , except in the randomized case we are only taking a sample of the values of g, resulting in a probabilistic privacy bound.
Composition of queries f 1 and f 2 works differently in the empirical than the classical setting. If we wish to perform another query f 2 on the same sequence of databases X t , we must jointly put both queries through the above privacy validation process, looking at the two-dimensional empirical probability densities of the joint query f = (f 1 , f 2 ). Without added noise, it is quite possible for f 1 and f 2 to be empirically private, but f = (f 1 , f 2 ) to precisely reveal individual information.
Although the Definition 1 shows how to obtain privacy guarantees for deterministic queries, it may sometimes still be useful to introduce randomized queries, as in the classical setting. In particular, if we find that the desired deterministic query is not empirically private enough, we can add a smaller amount of noise to the query in the same manner as classical differential privacy, such that combining samples of this noise with the natural randomness of the sample sequence of databases, achieves the desired empirical differential privacy.
Although we do not make any explicit statistical assumptions in this empirical approach, there are two important implicit assumptions on which the concluded privacy depends:
Independent Databases. To ensure that the empirical probability densities accurately represent the true underlying distribution, the sequence of databases should be a sample of independent draws from the hypothetical distribution of databases. No other specific statistical assumptions about the distribution of the databases, or statistical properties of the rows within each database, need be made.
A key property of the empirical approach is that statistical assumptions like this can be empirically tested. For example, one way the independence assumption could fail is autocorrelation; nevertheless, we can measure the autocorrelation of the query results on the sequence of databases. If there is significant empirical autocorrelation, one possible solution is to locally aggregate the databases in the sequence, to produce a shorter sequence of databases on a longer timescale where there is no significant autocorrelation. As another example, in a time series of databases, there could be secular changes in the distribution. To mitigate this, the empirical privacy analysis can be performed on a window of the time series wide enough to provide statistically valid results, but narrow enough to avoid the secular changes.
Representative Individuals. Since the empirical privacy criterion takes a maximum over all individuals in the sample population, it is important that the population contain representative individuals from across the distribution of individuals.
For example, the work of Yitao Duan [4] makes the explicit assumption that all individuals are statistically identical, and proves noiseless privacy of sum queries under that assumption. Our approach does not need such strict assumptions, but the individuals must still be representative.
Adversarial Setting
So far we have assumed that the adversary only has access to the published value of the statistical query. Classical differential privacy assumes that the adversary could have access to all of the underlying data except for the one individual whose privacy we are trying to protect. More typically, there is an intermediate situation in which the adversary knows some of the data. Moreover, there may be statistical dependency between the data known to the adversary and the rest of the unknown data [7] . In the empirical approach, we can handle all of these scenarios in a uniform way by looking at empirical conditional probability distributions instead of absolute distributions. Definition 2 Given a deterministic or randomized query f (X) and another query g(X) that reveals information known to an adversary, let P (y|Z) denote the empirical conditional probability distribution determined by the sample y t = f (X t ), over all t, conditional on knowledge g(X) ∈ Z of the adversary information. Similarly, if X t i is the same set of databases with the data from individual i removed, let P i (y|Z) denote the empirical conditional probability distribution determined by the sample f (X t i ), over all t, conditional on knowledge g(X) ∈ Z of the adversary information. Then we say that f is empirically (ε, δ)-differentially private with adversary g, based on the given sample, iff, for all individuals i, all sets of potential query results E, and all sets of potential adversary information Z,
This calculation generally requires a larger sample of databases X t because we are splitting the total data across values of the adversary information. To help with this, we can practically restrict the Z we test to larger buckets of the adversary data, at some cost in the accuracy of the privacy metrics. Nevertheless, this approach is only practical if the amount of adversarial information is limited.
For example, one typical way the adversarial setting comes into play is that even though the data is not public, each individual contributing to the database knows their own contribution. Thus we need to test differential privacy on the distributions conditional on each individual's contribution.
Numerical Considerations
There are a variety of methods available to estimate the probability density from sample data.
The simplest is to sort the sample answers to produce the empirical inverse cumulative distribution function, and then numerically invert and differentiate it. To balance bias and variance of the estimate, the numerical differencing should be taken across approximately the square root of the number of sample points.
Another popular method is kernel density esimation [10] , which for suitable choices of kernel can yield smoother results.
Nomenclature
We are aware of a previous unrelated use of the term "empirical differential privacy" initiated by Abowd et al. [1, 3] . However, their notion is not "empirical" but Bayesian, and not really a measure of "differential privacy" but a measure of local sensitivity of the Bayesian posterior distribution to the specific observational data set used to compute the posterior.
Applications
As an application, we look at the Chicago Food Inspections database [8] , which is made available under the Open Database License (ODbL [9] ). Specifically, we will look at the privacy of the monthly inspection failure rate with respect to individual establishments. (We will pretend for this example that the inspection results are not public information.)
As a first step, we must eliminate a source of autocorrelation in the data. When an establishment fails an inspection, it is re-inspected shortly thereafter and usually passes the followup inspection (or maybe the second re-inspection, if necessary). For this reason, we eliminate re-inspections from the data, and only look at inspections triggered directly by licensing, canvassing, or complaints.
We also eliminate inspections that did not result in a Pass or Fail (for example, the establishment was out of business).
Our sequence of databases is then the remaining data sequenced by the month in which the inspection occurred. This gives us a sample of 117 databases from the current data. Each establishment is identified in the databases by its license number. Given that we know little about the shape of the probability distribution, we use the non-parametric differencing method explained above to estimate the densities.
With this setup, we find that the monthly failure rate is for example at least (.03, .009)-private with respect to the establishments. The probability density dropping the establishment with the biggest δ for that ε is plotted in Figure 1 together with the probability density including all establishments. There are some differences in the middle of the density that appear to be due to empirical noise, but also some small systematic differences in the right tail of the density. The differences due to empirical noise are one reason why we generally have to allow δ > 0 in applications of empirical differential privacy. If we prefer smaller δ, we can choose larger ε, and we find that the same data is at least (.1, .002)-private.
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